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Introduction
This paper analyzes the price-setting behavior of multiproduct rms in a dif-
ferentiated product market. The structure considered is one where large com-
panies o¤er either a set of close substitutes or a set of distant substitutes.
The key feature of the model is the possibility for multiproduct companies
to choose their internal organizational structure. Each company, consisting of
n divisions, may either set prices from the above in order to maximize the
joint prots (as in the traditional approach), or alternatively, it may assign an
independent product manager to run each division. In other words, product
managers of the same company may behave either independently or coopera-
tively.
The modelling strategy of the paper is to allow for two di¤erent elasticities
of substitution: while  represents the intra-group (intra-company) elasticity
of substitution,  is the inter-group (inter-company) elasticity of substitu-
tion. Then, the product line of companies may consist of either a set of close
substitutes (market segmentation) or a set of distant substitutes (market in-
terlacing). Within this set-up, from the one side each brand competes more
intensively with closer substitutes and less intensively with distant substitutes;
from the other side two kinds of interactions must be considered: that among
products of the same multiproduct rm, and that among the latter and the
brands produced by rivals.
As is well known, multiproduct rms are typically established in order to ex-
ploit economies of scope or economies of scale in production. Moreover, they
may be the outcome of a merging process between rms aimed at removing
the main market constraints, and at reducing competition between them on
the demand side. It must be stressed that the literature mainly concentrated
upon the supply-side foundations of multiproduct rms, while the interac-
tions on the demand side have not received the same attention. Exceptions
are due to Katz (1984), Brander-Eaton (1984), Raubitschek (1987) and Ju
(2003). While Katz (1984) examines the e¤ects of competition on the price-
quality schedule, Brander and Eaton (1984) analyze multiproduct rms under
market segmentation and market interlacing. As far as market structure is
concerned, Raubitschek (1987) studies multiproduct rms under monopolistic
competition; Ju (2003) models multiproduct rms under oligopoly.
However, Raubitscheks assumption of monopolistic competition is not innocu-
ous. It amounts to assuming that each Product Manager (PM) believes that
all other PMs (including the PMs of the same large company) will react to an
individual unit expansion in output by a total reduction of the same amount 1 .
Therefore, given a large number of varieties in the market, rms exhibit the
1 In footnotes 3 and 4, Raubitschek assumes competitive conjectural derivatives in
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standard Cournot behavior 2 , but since they neglect whatever e¤ect on the
industry quantity-index, the equilibrium has the properties of the traditional
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. While Raubitscheks
conclusions are obviously correct given her assumptions, it must be stressed
that in the framework of the analysis of multiproduct rms these assumptions
seem to be questionable for at least three reasons. First, why should the PMs
of di¤erent companies react in the same way? Second, is it reasonable that
multiproduct rms decisions are taken as negligible for the market? Finally,
is it sensible to assume that the elasticity of substitution across products of
the same rm does not di¤er from that across products of di¤erent rms, thus
limiting the scope for product interaction on the demand side?
Ju (2003) does not su¤er from these criticisms. He allows for a oligopolistic
market structure and he takes into account both the industry price-index e¤ect
and the interactions on the demand side, distinguishing between the inter-
rm and the intra-rm elasticity of substitution. Another important di¤erence
between the above contributions concerns the decisional center in the rst
stage of the game. While Ju assumes that the PMs of the same rm behave
cooperatively, Raubitschek allows for independent PMs. In other words, the
price decisions come from a centralized General Direction (GD) in Jus paper,
and from independent PMs for each variety in Raubitscheks model.
In the analysis of multiproduct rmsorganizational structure it is common
to assume that the GD is responsible for two basic preliminary decisions. The
rst is the so-called proliferation decision: how many varieties to produce. The
second concerns the product line selection: which kind of variety to produce.
The key issue, however, is the denition of the decisional center responsible
for the price/quantity decisions. Should they be delegated to PMs or should
they be centralized in the GD? Which is the best corporate organization at
this decision level?
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a microfounded answer to this
question. While our model does not consider either the proliferation or the
product-line selection decisions, it deals with multiproduct rms price de-
cisions under oligopolistic competition, providing useful insights about the
question of whether and when a system of PMs decentralized decisions is
better than a mechanism with a centralized GD. The paper describes a di¤er-
entiated product market where goods are produced at constant and identical
marginal costs. The degree of competition is characterized through the use
of conjectural variations. To keep the analysis simple, for each PM we shall
quantities (@xhk@xij =   1n 1 , 8k 6= j and 8i, j; where x denote quantities and n denotes
the total number of variety in the market). Note that, di¤erently by us, she solves
for quantities instead of prices equilibrium.
2 For n!1, @xhk@xij =   1n 1 ! 0 .
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assume symmetric conjectures  on the reaction of the PMs of the same mul-
tiproduct rm, and symmetric conjectures  on the reaction of the PMs of
rival rms. Di¤erent values of the conjectural variations  are equivalent to
di¤erent internal organizational structures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the demand side of the
model starting from a compound CES utility function. Under the assumption
that each brand is produced by a mono-product rm, the market equilibrium
is derived in section 2 through the use of di¤erent conjectural variations. The
results are reinterpreted in section 3 in terms of optimal price-setting behav-
ior of multi-product rms, where the organizational structure of the corporate
rm is endogenous. In particular, it is shown that under market interlacing,
independent PMs may be more protable than a centralized GD. Some con-
clusions are gathered in section 4.
1 Preferences
Consider an economy with identical households. The economy produces a
numéraire homogeneous good and M  1 groups of di¤erentiated goods.
Each group consists of ni  1 (i = 1; :::;M) varieties or brands (indexed
by j = 1; :::; ni, 8i), so that the total number of varieties in the industry is
N =
MP
i=1
ni.
Preferences are identical for all consumers. The representative household max-
imizes the utility function U = U(x0; V ), where x0 is the numéraire good and
U() is homothetic in its arguments. Given this property, the utility maximiza-
tion problem can be decomposed into two steps (Spence 1976). In particular,
we assume that V has a compound CES functional form:
V (xi) =
"
MX
i=1
xi
# 1

(1)
xi(xij) =
0@ niX
j=1
xij
1A 1 (2)
where xij is the quantity consumed of the j-th product of the i-th group and
xi represents the quantity index of the i-th group. Concavity of V [xi (xij)]
requires that 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1 3 . This utility function implies a
3 The love for variety could alternatively be modelled in a slightly di¤erent frame-
work, by extending preferences over a continuous product space (Grossman and
Helpman, 1989; Krugman, 1980).
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